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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HARRIET RIPPENTROP, 
Plaintiff-Appellant~ 
vs. 
~IINNIE G. PICKERING, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELL~T 
No. 
9896 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Appellant brought action against respondent seek-
ing to establish a right-of-way used for a period of more 
than twenty years (R-1, pp. 5). Appellant alleged that 
the driveway in question has been used by appellant 
and her predecessors for a period of sixty or more years 
{Tr 2-4). Appellant also contends that the use of the 
driveway was continuous and uninterrupted, open and 
visible and that the use was adverse (R-1 pp. 5). Appel-
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lant further contends that the use of this driveway does 
have a definite and direct connection with the dominant 
tenement. Appellant alleges that recently, respondent 
did have constructed a fence which prevents any use 
of the said driveway by appellant (R-2, pp. 6b). Appel-
lant further contends that this driveway is the only 
reasonable way to ingress and egress to and from appel-
lant's backyard ( Tr-3, Tr 41) . 
. DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The pretrial order stated that appellant will seek 
only to establish a right-of-way used for a period of 
more than twenty years (R 14). A jury was duly 
selected and impanelled. After the appellant had intro-
duced evidence in support of her case and rested, the 
respondent made a motion for dismissal upon the 
ground that appellant had failed to prove facts upon 
which relief could be granted to appellant against 
respondent. The motion was denied, but the Court 
reserved the right to reconsider it at the close of the 
case. After evidence had been introduced by respondent 
and both parties had rested, the appellant and ~he 
respondent each made a motion for a directed verdict, 
which motions, after oral argument, were duly si.Ibmitted 
to the Court. The Court, being fully advised in the 
1natter, gi·anted the motion for dismissal of respondent 
previously made in said cause ( R 17) . 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower Court's 
Order of Dismissal . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves the right of appellant to use the 
common driveway located between the residences of 
appellant and respondent on the east side of Ninth East 
Street, the appellant's residence being at 241 South 
Ninth East ( Tr 2) and the respondent's residence is 
immediately south thereof at 251 on the same street 
(Tr 94). Only a narrow driveway separates the two 
homes. 
Appellant's residence was built before 1893 ( Tr 2) 
and the driveway involved was built at the same time 
and has been the only driveway ever used to service that 
home and yard (Tr 3) (Ex 2-P). The home of respon-
dent was not constructed until 1913 (Tr 3). There is 
no other way for a vehicle to enter the backyard of 
appellant (Tr 3, 27). Appellant's predecessor, S. Ran-
dolph Skidmore, who built appellant's home, was the 
son of Samuel Randolph Skidmore, and he acquired 
this narrow lot-25 feet wide-from his said father in 
1892 (P. 5, Ex 3-P) (Tr 3, 28). He later acquired an 
additional 114 feet along the south of the lot ( P. 17, 
Ex P -3) . This driveway has been continuously used by 
appellant and her predecessors for seventy years (Tr 2, 
4). The witness, Mrs. Karen S. Wilde, 70 years of age, 
has had personal knowledge of this use for her entire 
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life, having lived in the residence thirty-one years or 
more and then her son lived in it after her parents had 
died, down to 1955 (Tr 5), and the parents, S. Randolph 
Skidmore, lived there until 1946 (Tr 6). Mrs. 'Vilde 
visited her parents and her son in the home after she 
ceased to live there and -used the driveway on all 
occasions ( Tr 5, 6). No permission was ever requested 
or granted for the use of this driveway (Tr 7, 38). 
The witness, Mrs. Wilde, owned the appellant's 
property from about 1946 to 1958 or 1959 (Tr 26). 
The driveway between the two residences is narrow 
and will not permit vehicles to pass between the resi-
dences ( Exs 4, 5, 6, 7) . The narrow residence shown in 
the photographs is the residence o~ appellant and the 
wide bungalow-type home to the right is that of respon-
dent (Tr 45-6). Respondent had constructed a fence 
in 1962 (Tr 45) (Ex 8-P) to preclude appellant from 
using the driveway to get into her backyard with any 
vehicle, within about 18 inches of the southeast corner 
of the appellant's house (Tr 26, 27). 
The father of S. Randolph Skidmore also deeded 
the lot to his daughter, Mae, the first wife of Alex 
Pickering, in about 1909, but before he did that, and 
in the same year, he deeded an extra strip to his son 
to extend to the center of this driveway to prevent any 
future trouble about the use of the driveway ( Tr 30, 
31, 35, 36). It was intended that the property line 
between the Rippentrop and the Pickering properties 
be the center of the driveway with which we are involved 
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( Tr 36, 37, 38) . This old line was accepted and lived 
by for more than the last forty years (Tr 20). 
~Irs. Rippentrop bought the property involved here 
in 1959 (Tr 40) and used the said driveway, which is 
ten feet and four inches wide ( Tr 41) with trucks and 
other automobile travel ( Tr 42) . No other driveway 
exists nor is there romn for one on the north side of the 
house ( Tr 41) . No permission was asked by the Rippen-
trop children of the respondent for use of the driveway, 
but they used it as their own property ( Tr 43) . The 
respondent granted no permission for this use ( Tr 44). 
The fence, which the respondent built in 1962 to shut 
off this long-established use of the driveway, is con-
structed so close to the appellant's house that, not only 
does it prevent vehicles from using the property as 
theretofore, but they cannot enter the backyard of appel-
lant's property and there is not room for a person to 
squeeze between the fence and the appellant's house 
without turning sideways. It is impossible to get the 
garbage cans through this narrow aperture (Tr 44, 45). 
The line accepted and respected by the property 
owners on the north of appellant's property is 2674 feet 
north of the center of the driveway in dispute, and this 
center line of the driveway was likewise accepted and 
acquiesced in as the property line between appellant's 
and defendant's properties until respondent built the 
fence last fall ( Tr 54). This is the width of the lot con-
veyed by Mrs. Wilde's grandfather to her father, pre-
decessor in appellant's property (Pages 5 and 17 of 
Ex 3-P). 
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POINTS URGED FOR RE\TERSAL 
POINT I 
APPELLANT RAISED SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO SHOW THE USE HAS 
BEEN OPEN, VISIBLE, CONTINUOUS AND 
UNMOLESTED FOR A PERIOD OF TIME 
SUFFICIENT TO ACQUIRE AN EASE-
MENT BY ADVERSE USER AND THAT 
IN LIGIIT OF THIS EVIDENCE AND 
BECAUSE OF THE PREVAILING RULE 
IN UT.A.H, THERE SHOULD BE A PRE-
SUMPTION OF ADVERSE USER A.ND 
THIS PRESUMPTION SHALL EXIST 
UNTIL REBUTTED BY RESPONDENT. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT DID NOT PRESENT 
SU:FFICIENT EVIDENCE TO REBUT A 
PRESUMPTION OF ADVERSE USER AND 
FAILED TO BRING FORTH EVIDENCE 
WHICH 'VOULD PROVE AN ADVERSE 
USE DID NOT CONTINUE FOR A PERIOD 
OF TWENTY YEARS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT RAISED SUFFICIENT 
EV-IDENCE TO SHO\V THE USE HAS 
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BEEN OPEN, ,riSIBLE, CONTINUOUS ..:\.:'~D 
UNl\IOLESTED FOR A PERIOD OF TI:NIE 
SUFFICIENT TO ACQUIRE AN EASE-
JlENT BY ADVERSE USER AND THAT 
1~ LIGIIT OF TillS EVIDENCE AND 
BECAUSE OF THE PREVAILING RULE 
I~ UTAII, THERE SHOULD BE A PRE-
SlTl\IPTION OF ADVERSE USER AND 
THIS PRESlJNIPTION SHALL EXIST 
CXTIL REBUTTED BY RESPONDENT. 
Appellant did present evidence to show that the 
driveway in question was constructed by appellant's 
predecessors se,Tenty or more years ago (Tr 2-4) (Ex 
~-P). Evidence was also presented to show that the 
driveway in question was constructed approximately 
thirty years before the home in which respondent now 
resides was constructed ( Tr 2, 3) . There has also been 
evidence to show that respondent did not become the 
wife of Alex Pickering until 1942 (Tr 63), which was 
a period long after the alleged right-of-way was estab-
lished. 
Appellant also has presented evidence of a second 
deed (Tr 30, 31, 35, 36) which purports to convey one-
half of the driveway in question to appellant's predeces-
sors. There has been testimony to the effect that the deed 
in question was conveyed for the purpose of preventing 
any controversy which might arise over the driveway in 
the future ( Tr 30) . Appellant contends this should be 
evidence to show that the driveway was used under a 
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claim of right. Appellant now contends that if the 
Court so finds the facts as they have been presented, 
there should be a presumption of adverse user. 
In 17 A Am.Jur., Page 687, Section 74, the author 
states 
"Generally the establishment of a prescriptive 
right depends upon showing a continued and 
uninterrupted., and an open and visible use of a 
definite right in the land of another which is 
identical to that claimed as an easement and 
which has a relation to the use of, and a direct 
and apparent connection with, the dominant 
tenement, under an adverse user and claim of 
right for a period corresponding generally to the 
statutory period of limitations." (Italics ours.) 
In Utah, the statutory period is twenty years. 
When an easement does arise, it creates two distinct 
tenements: 
1. Dominant-To whom the easement belongs. 
2. Servient-Upon whom obligation rests. 
(Corporeal estate) . 
It is further stated in 17 A Am.J ur., Page 682, 
Section 70, 
"In absence of circumstances to the contrary, 
if a way has been enjoyed for a long time under 
circumstances which would be sufficient, under 
the local statute of limitations, to bar a recovery 
of real estate, there is a presumption of grant the 
evidence of which has been lost." (Italics ours.) 
A prescriptive easement, being founded upon the 
supposition of a grant must necessarily be exercised or 
10 
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made.' usc of in such a way as to indicate that it is cluimcd 
({.'i a ri:;/Lt. See Northwest Cities Gas Co. v. I'V estern 
Fuel Co., Inc., et al, 123 P.2d 771, wherein it is stated: 
"A elai1n of right in essence rests in intent as 
exem.plified by acts and conduct. Failure of the 
servient owner to interrupt the user of a right 
of way across his land by another is strong evi-
dence that the parties thought that the way was 
used as a matter of right." 
'I' here is, however, a conflict of authority as to 
whether a use of a elai1ned easement for the prescriptive 
period raises a presumption of permissive use or, on the 
other hand, a prestnnption of adverse user. 27 ALR 2d, 
324. 
"'fhe prevailiny rule, however, is that where 
a clai1nant has shown an open, visible, continuous, 
and un1nolested use of land for the period of 
ti1ne sufficient to acquire an easement by adverse 
user, the use will be presu1ned to be adverse 
(17A Am. Jur., Section 73, Footnote 19, Page 
684) and under a claim of right; 17 A Am. J ur., 
Page 685, Section 73, Footnote 20) and the 
owner of the servient estate, in order to avoid 
the acquisition of an easement by prescription 
from arising has the burden of showing evidence 
which will rebut this presumption by showing 
that the use was permissive." (Italics our~.) 
In the case of Zollinger v. Frank~ 110 Utah 514, 
17.j P.2d 71-4, the (:tah Supreme Court said 
"lVe think the better rule is that described as 
the prevailing rule in the above quotation. That 
is, where a claimant has shown an open and con-
tinuous use of the land for the prescriptive period 
11 
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(20 years in Utah) the use will be presumed to 
have been against the owner and the owner of 
the servient estate of prevent the prescriptive 
easement from arising has the burden of showing 
that the use was under him instead of against 
him.'' 
In the case of Savage v. Nielsen~ et al~ 114 Utah 
22. 197 P.2d 117, the above case of Zollinger v. Frank~ 
81-tpra was cited, and the Court clearly indicated that 
they preferred following the rule as it is set forth in said 
case. This case also indicated by discussion that con-
struction without permission by one who is not the 
designated owner, would be evidence that the person 
so performing the construction intended to claim and 
possess premises or a right of way over premises 
adversely. 
In the case of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Com-
pany v. Moyle~ 109 Utah 197, the Court stated 
"It is true that to establish an easement the 
use must be notorious and continuous and on 
this adverseness-that is holding against the 
owner-will be presumed." 
In a 1ninority of instances in which no oral agree-
Inent as foundation of the common use was directly 
shown (although, of course, the existence of some sort 
of understanding is usually inferable from the circum-
stances) , the use was regarded as permissive only so as 
not to give rise to a prescriptive right in either owner 
as against the owner. A discussion with citations is set 
12 
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forth in 27 ALR 2d 351. It should be noted that this 
does not seem to be the tendency in Utah. 
If the use be so open, visible and apparent that it 
gives the owner of the servient tenement knowledge and 
full opportunity to assert his rights, by his inaction or 
his failure to assert his rights, his acquiescence can be 
presumed. Furthermore, if the owner knows from other 
sources of a use which is not open and visible and he 
acquiesces in it, a prescriptive easement may be acquired 
against him. Acquiescence defined: Passive compliance 
or satisfaction; distinguished from avowed consent on 
the one hand, and, on the other, from opposition or 
open discontent. See Norfolk and W. R. Co. v. Perdue) 
40 ,V.,T a. 442, 21 SE 755, wherein it is stated 
"It arjses where a person who knows that he 
is entitled to impeach a transaction or enforce 
a right neglects to do so for such a length of time 
that, under the circumstances of the case, the 
other party may fairly infer that he has waived 
or abandoned his right." 
Permissive user means more than acquiescence: See 
Feldman) et ux v. l(nappJ et uxJ 250 P.2d 92, 
"An owner's acquiescence in an adverse user 
of driveway across his land without more, does 
not show that the use, clain1ed to be adverse, was 
in fact permissive." 
As the testimony and evidence brought forth indi-
cates, the predecessors of both appellant and respondent 
were related and on excellent terms (R-18) (Tr 29). 
This fact by itself is insufficient to permit the court to 
13 
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presume a permissive use existed. In order to establish 
adverse intent or hostility, a hot controversy, or declara-
tion of adverse intent or the existence of unrelated 
parties is not necessary. See Jacobs~ et ux v. Brewster, 
et at 190 SW 2d 894, wherein it is stated 
"To establish the hostility required for acqui-
sition of an ease1nent by prescription it is not 
necessary to show that there was a heated con-
troversy, or a manifestation of ill will, or that 
the clain1ant was in any sense an enemy of the 
owner of the servient estate, nor is it necessary 
that the claimant make declarations of an ad-
verse intent during the prescriptive period, or 
that he testify later that his intent was of that 
character.'' 
To further support this conclusion, there are 1nany 
cases in which controversies of this type arise between 
imn1ediate members of families. Respondent has failed 
to bring forth any evidence, other than evidence to indi-
cate the relationship of the predecessors of both appel-
lant and respondent, that would allow the court to infer 
that a permissive use, expressly or impliedly, existed 
between the predecessors of appellant and respondent. 
In absence of express license or permission, how 
should the character of the use be determined? See 103 
1-\..LR 677, wherein it sets forth the following 
"The character of the use of an easement as 
adverse or permissive, where there is neither 
proof of an express license or permission from 
the landowner nor of an express claim of right 
by the person using the easement, is to be deter-
14 
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1nined from the circumstances of the parties and 
the nature and character of its use." 
There is evidence which indicates that the predeces-
sors of appellant constructed and used the driveway 
in question before the house in which respondent resides 
was constructed (Tr 2. 3). So far as anyone knows, this 
driveway was constructed and used in absence of any 
permission or form of oral agreement between the in-
Yolved parties. The discussion in Savage v. Nielsen, et 
al, supra, indicates that construction without permission 
by one who is not the designated owner, would be evi-
dence that the person so performing the construction 
intended to claim and possess premises or a right of 
way over premises adversely. Furthermore, when 
respondent's predecessors built their home, they 
acknowledged the existence of the driveway and to 
avoid interfering with the use of the driveway, built 
their home a few feet to the south of the driveway. 
From their acts and conduct, it is reasonable to infer 
their acquiescence to the use of the driveway. It should 
be noted, also, that the home in which respondent now 
lives was not constructed until approximately thirty 
years after the construction of the driveway. 
The driveway, which was constructed by appellant's 
predecessors, throughout the years, has been used for 
the purpose it was constructed for, that is, ingress and 
egress to appellant's backyard and by the very early 
predecessors, it was used for ingress and egress to a barn 
which, at one time, existed behind appellant's home 
( Tr 4, 5). The use, over the years, has been generally 
15 
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the same type use that has been made and that is n1ade 
of driveways in general. 
It should be apparent to the Court that there has 
always existed a claim of a definite right, which has been 
and still is a claim of right to use the driveway in ques-
tion as a passageway to and from the backyard ( Tr 3) 
(Tr 41). 
'"fhe right to use this driveway definitely has a direct 
effect upon the dominant tenement. If the Court were 
to destroy appellant's right to use the driveway, it 
would cause the market value of appellant's property 
and as well, the rental value of the various units to 
decline considerably. Also, to deliver coal, or in the event 
of a fire, or to haul other supplies or rubbish to and from 
appellant's backyard, it is necessary to use this driveway 
because it is the only reasonable route to the the back-
yard ( Tr 3) ( Tr 41 ) . 
In light of the foregoing facts and in reference to 
the law that has a direct bearing on the problem at 
hand, which the courts in the majority adhere to, it is 
only reasonable and practical, as well as just, that the 
Court make a presumption of adverse user, such pre-
sumption being rebuttable by respondent. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT DID NOT PRESENT 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO REBUT A 
PRESlJ~IPTION OF .A_D,7ERSE USER AND 
16 
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FAILED TO BRING FORTH EVIDENCE 
'VHICH 'VOULD PRO,TE AN ADVERSE 
USE DID NOT CONTINUE FOR A PERIOD 
OF T'VENTY YEARS. 
Respondent has presented evidence, which indicates 
that since about I935, there have been intervals of time 
during which the use of the driveway in question has 
been limited ( Tr 32, 66). Respondent, also, has con-
tended that her consent was given to those who have 
used the driveway since she became entitled to rights 
in the property. These allegations made by respondent 
present two different questions, which must be answered 
by apply ing the facts of this case to the law. 
I. Presuming there was an acquisition of a pre-
scriptive easement by appellant's predecessors, 
it must be determined whether or not there 
has been an abandonment of this prescriptive 
right. 
2. \Vhat effect does informal consent which is 
given subsequent to a hostile entry have upon 
the rights of the holder of the prescriptive ease-
ment? 
In answer to Question I, see Johnson v. Hyde 
(188I), 33 NJEq. 632; also Polson v. Ingram (I884), 
22 SC 54 I; 25 ALR 2d I283: 
"Mere nonuse of a prescriptive right will not 
destroy the right unless there be evidence of an 
intention to abandon it." 
It is further set forth in I7 A Am.J ur., Page 780, Sec-
tion I73: 
17 
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"An easement acquired by prescription Inay 
be extinguished by a nonuser under circumstances 
indicating an intention of abandonment whenever 
such nonuser has extended over a length of time 
equal to the prescriptive period. But mere non-
user of a prescriptive easement for a relatively 
short time will not constitute abandonment." 
(Italics ours.) 
Also, it is further stated by the author at 17 A Am.J ur., 
Page 776, Section 170 that 
"The intention to abandon is the material ques-
tion and may be proved by an infinite variety of 
acts. It is a question of fact to be ascertained 
from all of the circumstances of the case, and 
the n1oment the intention to abandon and the 
relinquishme·nt of possession unites~ the aban-
donment is complete. 
"''l'ime is not an essential element of abandon-
ment, and is not necessarily an important con-
sideration in determining whether an easement 
has been lost by abandonment." (Italics ours.) 
See Anno: 25 ALR 2d 1285; Weideman v. Staheli 
(1948}, 88 Cal.App. 2d 613, 199 P.2d 351: 
"If the fee owner, to show an abandonment 
of a way originating in prescription, relies on 
evidence of a long period of nonuse, it is enough 
for the easement claimant to show that during 
this period he visited his property from time to 
time and passed over the way until a wash-out 
rendered it impassable; that for several years he 
was unable to secure a bulldozer to make repairs, 
that upon his securing it and beginning repairs, 
the fee owner placed a chain across the way and 
denied his right to use it." 
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The burden of proving the abandonment of an 
easement is upon the party alleging it. The abandon-
ment must be established by clear and unequivocal evi-
dence of decisive and conclusive acts, and unless the 
intent to abandon and easement plainly appears, the 
courts are not inclined to favor the forfeiture of the 
easement on that ground. 
Even though there has been a period during the 
last thirty years during which time, the use was limited, 
if the reasons for the limitation of the use are analyzed, 
it is evident that there has been no indication of an 
intent to abandon the prescriptive easement which if 
acquired would have been acquired prior to respondent's 
occupancy. 
In answer to Question 2, see Anno: 65 ALR 128, 
which states as follows: 
"There is authority to the effect that where an 
entry is hostile and adverse to the true owner and 
the user following such entry is likewise adverse, 
the later unsought and unrecognized consent of 
the owner will not prevent the adverse claimant 
from gaining an easementby prescription." (Ital-
ics ours.) 
The respondent has failed to produce evidence 
which would permit an inference that any subsequent 
acts of the predecessors of either appellant or respondent 
changed the adverse use into a permissive use. It seems 
as though from the testimony of both appellant and 
respondent, even if respondent did give her consent to 
the use of the driveway in question that it was informal 
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consent subsequent to an acquisition of a prescriptive 
easement. 
The acts and conduct of appellant certainly do not 
indicate that she was ever under the impression that the 
driveway was to be used by· permission only, in fact, 
her acts and conduct indicate just the opposite. Further-
more, the people who owned the property prior to 
appellant were under the same impression as indicated 
by their testimony ( Tr 4, 5, 7) . 
By interpretation of respondent's testimony and by 
her acts and conduct, it is reasonable to assume respon-
dent did not positively know that she was the sole owner 
of the driveway in question until she had the driveway 
and her property surveyed ( Tr 69) . 
In order to arrive at a just result, the Court should 
not, in light of the existing circun1stances, be permitted 
to presume that the construction and use of the drive-
way by appellant's predecessors was permissive and 
further, in light of the testimony and evidence, should 
not be allowed to conclude that if there was an adverse 
user, subsequent consent by respondent's predecessors 
was sufficient to change the adverse use into a permissive 
use. The Court should be required to presume the use 
was adverse; that is, in reference to the original entry 
and use made of the property by appellant's predeces-
sors. The Court should also be required to presume an 
adverse use continued for the prescriptive period until 
respondent presents sufficient evidence to rebut this 
presumption. 
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CONCLUSION 
The appellant has presented sufficient evidence to 
show that the use of the property in question by appel-
lant's predecessors was open, visible, continuous, and 
unmolested, and because of this evidence, there should 
be a presumption of adverse user and that such pre-
sumption continues until rebutted by evidence presented 
by the respondent. 
It should clearly be evident that the respondent 
has failed to present the kind of evidence required by 
law in sufficient quantity to rebut such a presumption. 
Respondent, also, has failed to bring forth evidence 
which in any way indicates that the use of the driveway 
by appellant's predecessors was not continuous for a 
period of twenty years. It must be remembered that the 
law only requires use of the property which is continu-
ous and uninterrupted for a period of twenty years. 
This means a use that is not interrupted by the act of 
the owner of the land, or by voluntary abandonment 
by the party claiming the easement. If use is inter-
rupted, prescription is annihilated and must begin again. 
The right cannot be acquired by occasional and sporadic 
acts for temporary purposes. However, it is not required 
that such use be made every day of the statutory period, 
but simply, the exercise of the right more or less fre-
quently according to the nature of the use. 
The lower Court erred when it inferred that because 
of the relationship of the predecessors of both appellant 
and respondent, that a permissive use existed. The lower 
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Court erred again when it granted the 1notion for dis-
missal of the suit. 
In the alternative, if the Court should infer that a 
permissive use did exist between S. Randolph Skidmore 
and Samuel Randolph Skidmore, his father, it would be 
only reasonable for the Court to hold that from the 
date of the execution of the second deed, the driveway 
from that point on was used under a claim of right. 
It is respectfully urged that the case be remanded 
to the lower court with instructions to enter judgment 
for the plaintiff (appellant) and against the defendant 
that plaintiff is entitled to the free and unobstructed 
use of the driveway; that defendant remove the fence 
already constructed so as not to interfere with plaintiff's 
access to her back yard. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Milton A. Oman 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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